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Profit warnings are issued by companies to inform shareholders that the current year’s 
profit will be significantly lower than the profit of the previous year or the anticipated 
profit for the current year (Jensen, 2005). The aim of this paper is to determine whether 
investors can rely on profit warnings as lead indicators of falling share prices. An event 
study is carried out to determine when the decline of share prices occurs with reference 
to issuance of profit warnings. A hypothesis test is then carried out to determine if the 
decline prior to the issuance of a profit warning is of material significance. The data used 
is of Kenya’s NSE, between the years 2002 and 2016. 
  
 












A negative profit warning is an irregular and unpredictable disclosure, downgrading a 
firm's expected earnings (Sphor, 2014). Profit warnings are mainly issued as part of 
regulatory requirements - for example NSE listed firms that anticipate a drop of more 
than 25% of value - but can also be issued voluntarily. 
The decision to issue a profit warning might appear as counterproductive for a firm as 
it immediately erodes shareholder value as reflected in the share price. Jensen (2005) 
argues that equity overvaluation, as a result of information asymmetry, might have an 
adverse effect on firms. Managers, in attempting to maintain an illusion of growth, 
would be tempted to manipulate financial statements. In order to ease this pressure and 
the information asymmetry between owners and managers, he recommends that firms 
issue profit warnings when performance that would warrant a certain equity valuation 
cannot be achieved. 
Abnormal returns prior to the issuance of a profit warning occur because of a prior 
surprise announcement, market anticipation or insider trading (Kodongo, 2012). The 
object of this study is the last two reasons, as they are likely to disenfranchise an investor 
who relies on company announcements.  
The case study of Restaurant Group - a chain of restaurants and public houses based in 
the UK - best illustrates the scenario. The company’s share price declined by 57% 
between 14th January 2016 and 5th May 2016 (Oakley, 2016). Due to prior anticipation in 
the market the share price had already declined by 44.12% prior to the issuance of a 





Figure 1: The share price decline of Restaurant Group year 2016. 
Figure 1: The share price decline of Restaurant Group year 2016 
According to Oakley (2016), factors that make a company more likely to issue a profit 
warning are: overvalued shares relative to earnings, retail businesses affected by 
slowing growth, high debt relative to assets, heavy reliance on commodity prices and 
cyclical industries. For contrarian investors, profit warnings can be an opportunity to 
buy largely unpopular shares at low prices provided the company maintains its 
financial fundamentals.  
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1.2 Problem Statement 
From the efficient market hypothesis, share prices should begin declining when a profit 
warning is issued. For a semi-strong form efficient market, this decline should occur 
mainly in the announcement date whereas it may take longer than a day for a weak 
form efficient market (Kodongo, 2012). Herrerias & Bulkley (2003) find that there 
appears to be some abnormal returns information that occurs before the profit warning. 
Anderson & Chang (2011) established that share prices in the market begin declining 
prior to the issuing of a profit warning. This is corroborated by Oakely (2016) in the case 
of Restaurant Group where the share price declines by 44.12% prior to the issuing of a 
profit warning. Consequently, investors who rely on profit warnings seem to be left at 
a material disadvantage.  
This research seeks to identify whether profit warnings can be reliably used to predict 
share price decline. This is of particular interest since most researchers have focused on 
what happens after a profit warning is issued [(Sphor, 2014) (Herrerias & Bulkley, 
2003)]. Using an event study methodology to determine abnormal returns, a 
significance amount of 10% of cumulative abnormal returns is used for abnormal 
returns occurring prior to the issuance of a profit warning. 
1.3 Research Objectives 
1. To determine whether share prices in the NSE begin declining prior to profit 
warnings. 
2. To determine whether declines prior to issuance of profit warnings are of material 
significance. 
1.4 Research Questions 
1. Do share prices in the NSE exchanges begin declining prior to profit warnings? 
2. Are declines prior to issuance of profit warnings of material significance? 
12 
 
1.5 Importance of the Research 
Insurance companies and pension funds hold significant amounts of their portfolio in 
listed equities. Such equities are prone to erosion of value due to profit warning 
requirements of stock exchanges (for example the NSE requires any company 
anticipating a drop in profits of more than 25% of the previous year to issue a profit 
warning). Due to liquidity requirements and asset liability matching, it would be proper 
for such companies to realize to what extent they should rely on profit warnings as their 
indicator for a falling share price. 
1.6 Scope and Limitation of Study 
The study is carried out in the NSE, a weak form efficient market, therefore 
generalizations can be difficult to make. The study is also limited to a time period of 14 
years and 21 listed companies. 
1.7 Chapter Summary 
Profit warnings present a unique case in event studies as unlike other events little or no 
anticipation prior to the occurrence of the warning should occur. It is therefore 
important for investors that these warnings be reliable otherwise they will be left at a 
material disadvantage. This study seeks to establish whether profit warnings issued in 
the NSE can be relied upon by investors to give timely information that leaves them at 




2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Profit Warnings 
Dave Jackson and Jeff Madura in their 2003 paper, Profit warnings and timing, find that 
profit warning announcements cause a strong negative market response that is not 
sensitive to timing the warning in advance of the earnings announcement. Using an 
event study approach to compare cumulative abnormal returns, they find that 
Share prices begin to adjust about five days before a profit warning, and the market 
reaction is not complete until about five days after the warning (Madura & Jackson, 
2003). They however do not proceed to find out the cause of share decline prior to the 
issuance of the profit warning. 
Michael Jensen, in his 2005 paper Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity, justifies the need 
for a profit warning. He proposes that if equity becomes overvalued, managers are 
tempted to manipulate financial statements in order to sustain the perceived growth. 
Overvalued equity according to him, is where a company cannot possibly generate 
earnings to justify the price attached to the equity. This leads to scandals that destroy 
shareholder value. To counter the aforementioned, he proposes the issuing of a profit 
warning to rectify the information asymmetry. Jensen however does not show 
empirically how share prices react to the issuance of profit warnings. He also does not 
support empirically, his assertion that issuing a profit warning is good for the company 
in the long run. 
George Bulkley and Renata Herrerias in their 2005 paper, Does the precision of news affect 
market under reaction? Evidence from returns following two classes of profit warnings, 
evaluate whether markets react rationally to profit warnings. Significant abnormal 
negative returns is found in the first three months after the announcement of a profit 
warning. If the disclosure is less precise, they find that under reaction is likely to 
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happen. They however give more emphasis to the period after issuance of a profit 
warning as opposed to the period before. 
Claude Francoeur, Réal Labelle, Isabelle Martinez in their 2008 paper, Governance and 
the decision to issue a profit warning, find that corporate boards are more likely to issue a 
profit warning if they believe analysts are driving up the stock price as opposed to if it 
is the  general market. A determinant model for deciding whether an overvalued 
company will issue a profit warning is used; with the grade from the Globe and Mail 
Report on Business as a proxy for governance. The study however overlooks the impact 
of the said profit warnings on the market focusing instead on the decision to issue a 
profit warning. 
Warwick W Anderson and Ava Chang in their 2011 paper, Are profit warnings and 
suspension notices adequate disclosures of distress, find that share prices do begin declining 
prior to the release of a profit warning. By using an event study to determine the point 
of decline and Altman’s Z-score for the level of the firm’s distress, they find that there 
is significant weekly cumulative abnormal return prior to the issuing of the disclosure. 
These brings into question the efficiency of required disclosures of the New Zealand 
Stock Exchange as timely or adequate identifiers of distress. The study does not 
however seek to identify whether there are more adequate and timely indicators of 






2.2 Market Efficiency 
In their 1969 paper, The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Information, Fama, Fisher, 
Jensen and Roll seek to establish how share prices adjust to include information on stock 
splits. They introduce the event study methodology to determine the abnormal returns 
of the stock as a result of stock splits. The event study methodology solves the joint 
hypothesis problem whereby to test for market sufficiency, an equilibrium model is 
needed to come up with the proper prices of securities. They conclude that markets 
adjust fully by the end of the split month and that this adjustment is almost fully 
reflected on the date of announcement of the split. This leads to the general conclusion 
that the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) is “efficient”. The concept of market 
efficiency is however not properly defined; with the abstract definition of stocks 
reacting quickly to market information. 
Eugene Fama in his 1970 paper, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical 
Work, lays out the conceptual framework of market efficiency. He classifies market 
efficiency into three forms: weak form, semi-strong form and strong form market 
efficiency. Weak form market efficiency includes all historical information in the pricing 
of a stock. Semi-strong form market efficiency incorporates all publicly available 
information in stock pricing. Strong form efficiency includes public and private 
information in the pricing of stocks. The concept of markets existing in three discrete 
forms is useful but however underscores the reality where markets exist at various 
points in relation to efficiency. He further examines the random walk and martingale 
approaches to market efficiency. The random walk model proposes that if a market is 
efficient then (𝛷𝑡) = (?̃?𝑗,𝑡+1)whereas the martingale model proposes that if a market is 
efficient, then 𝐸(𝛷𝑡) = 𝐸(?̃?𝑗,𝑡+1).  
         Where ?̃?𝑗,𝑡+1 is the return of security j at time t+1 
                     𝛷𝑡 is the filtration of security j at time t 
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The condition of efficiency of the random walk model is stronger as it proposes that the 
entire return process should not consider the historical returns of the stock. The 
martingale approach on the other hand proposes that the immediate future return does 
not depend on the past returns.  
In the 1991 paper, Efficient Capital Markets: II, Eugene Fama creates three new categories 
of market efficiency to replace the former classification. The first category, tests for 
returns predictability, includes all weak form efficiency tests and forecasting returns 
using fundamental factors like dividend yield. The second category, event studies, 
contains exactly the same work as semi-strong form efficiency. The third category, tests 
for private information, is similar to strong form efficiency. The three new categories 
are more appropriately named in relation to their use. Fama proposes that the cleanest 
form of market efficiency comes from event studies, especially those using daily 
returns. On private information, he concludes that a longer time period of abnormal 
returns is required which runs into the joint-hypothesis problem. The information 
obtained cannot be attributed to market efficiency or the lack of it thereof or the failure 
of the equilibrium model.   
Grossman and Stiglitz in their 1980 paper, On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient 
Markets, propose that there are two types of traders; the informed and the uninformed. 
Informed traders obtain information about a financial security at a cost and make 
decisions based on this information and the price of the security. Uninformed traders 
make decisions based on the price of the security alone. Informed traders therefore 
make previously unknown information accessible to uninformed traders by their 
trading impact on price. As a precondition to strong form efficiency, Grossman and 
Stiglitz propose that information, trading costs and costs of getting prices to reflect 
information should be zero. A paradox arises since a point will reach when the marginal 
costs of obtaining and acting on information supersede the marginal benefits. At such 
17 
 
a point the market is said to be efficient (Jensen 1978). This then leads to less information 
seeking hence the information content of the prices reduces making the market 
inefficient again and therefore profitable to the informed trader. Grossman and Stiglitz 
appear to suggest that markets can never be efficient since by being so, they destroy 
that which made them efficient in the first place; the pursuit and use of information to 
make a trading profit. The implication of the paper is that different markets are at 
various points of efficiency depending on their costs of obtaining information and 
trading on that information. 
Jones and Netter in their 2008 paper, Efficient Capital Markets, define an efficient market 
as that where the price of an asset reflects all relevant information that is available about 
the intrinsic value of the asset. The reason why investors trade securities is because they 
perceive them to be either undervalued or overvalued. In anticipation of obtaining a 
profit, they drive the stock price closer to the present value of its future cash flows. 
These statement is incomplete as trading has been shown to drive stock prices away 
from their intrinsic values. According to them, investors want to know whether a 
market is efficient for two main reasons: to find out whether different trading strategies 
can outperform a benchmark and if the market is efficient, new investment capital will 
then be directed to the highest valued use. Their paper compares the efficient capital 





2.3 Event Study Methodology 
Brown and Warner (1984) in the paper, Using Daily Stock Returns: The Case of Event 
Studies, examine how the properties of daily stock returns data impacts event study 
methodologies for assessing the effect of specific events on a firm’s share prices. Daily 
stock returns are more skewed from the normal distribution than monthly stock 
returns, with fatter tails relative to the normal distribution (Fama E., Foundations of 
Finance, 1976). Also, according to Scholes and Williams (1977), parameter bias due to 
non-synchronous trading1 is more severe when using daily data. The methodology 
used to establish the effect of using daily data is various event studies on arbitrarily 
selected securities with random event dates; the result should be no abnormal returns 
on average if performance is measured correctly. They conclude that the non-normality 
of daily returns has no obvious impact on event study methodologies. Further, the 
procedures suggested by Scholes, Williams and Dimson do reduce the bias of OLS 
estimates of beta (β), but offer no clear cut advantage in detecting abnormal returns.  
In the paper, Event Studies: A Review of Issues and Methodology, Peterson (1989) proposes 
that the purpose of an event study is to examine the market’s response to some well-
defined event through the observation of share prices around such an event. In 
choosing the period of estimation of the model parameters, the improved prediction 
from a longer period should be weighed against the parameter instability a longer 
period causes. She recommends that the event date should be chosen with the highest 
precision as it affects the explanatory power of the event study. She further notes that 
that event studies carried out using daily returns data are more powerful than those 
that use monthly data. The use of daily data however brings in the problem of a biased 
beta (β) due to non-synchronous trading. To solve this, she proposes the use of Scholes-
                                                 
1
Non-Synchronous trading refers to securities being traded with trading delays different than those of the market.  
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William Procedure2 or the Dimson procedure3. She however concludes that these 
complicated alternative procedures offer no clear cut advantage over the OLS method.  
 
In the paper, The Event Study Methodology Since 1969, Binder (1998) examines the 
developments of the event study methodology from the original - developed by Fama, 
Fisher, Jensen and Roll – highlighting extensions, contributions and modifications to 
the technique since then. Two modifications have become standard. Firstly, studies 
using monthly observations use five to seven years of data whereas those using daily 
data use one year of observations (Binder, 1998). Secondly, the event period is excluded 
from the period used to estimate the parameters because the disturbances during the 
period contain the effects of the event. Hypothesis tests on the abnormal returns are 
inhibited because abnormal return estimators are cross-sectionally correlated (Collins 
& Dent, 1984), have different variances across companies [(Jaffe, 1974) (Mandelker, 
1974)], are time inhomogeneous and have greater variance during the event period. To 
combat the aforementioned problems, Jaffe (1974) and Mandelker (1974) introduce the 
portfolio approach. To standardize results the average abnormal returns across all firms 
are calculated and then divided by the estimated standard deviation. Binder concludes 
that while questions have arisen about the variability and covariability of abnormal 
returns, researchers have come up with solutions making hypothesis tests on event 
studies more powerful and less biased. 
  
                                                 
2
 The Scholes-Williams procedure involves estimating three OLS regressions of lagged, current and lead return 
values on the market index. 
3
 Dimson’s method requires a multiple regression estimation of lagged, current and lead values of the return of the 
market index and the aggregation of the slope coefficient in the formula. 
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2.4 Chapter Summary 
Previous studies on profit warnings have focused on the reasons for issuing profit 
warnings and how the market reacts to this thereafter. Others have expounded on the 
event study methodology and how adjustments can be made to improve it. Jackson and 
Madura 2003, however look at the issue of timing and conclude that markets begin 
adjusting five days prior to the issuance of the warning and continue for a further five 
days after the warning. The decline prior to the warning is found to be significant. From 
its inception in 1969 by Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll, the event study methodology 
continues to be the best way to test market reaction to a well-defined event albeit with 





The general methodology used is an event study with a market model regression. The 
data used and the structure of the methodology is discussed further in the remainder 
of the chapter. Particular emphasis is given to the sampling and procedure followed. 
3.2 Research Design 
The research follows a multi-cross sectional analytical design where data for each 
company is obtained during its profit warning period.  
The multi-cross sectionality design allows for comparison of firms that have issued 
profit warnings at different points in time. The value zero is used to represent the date 
of profit warning and other days are made with reference to it. 
3.3 Population and Sampling 
Of the 67 NSE listed firms 21 are included in the sample (see appendix 1 for the full list) 
giving it a 31.34% representation of all listed firms. The sample is therefore robust and 
conclusions made can be generalized to the entire market with a minimal chance of 
error. The breakdown of firms in the sample as per sector is as follows: 
Sector Number of firms 
Agricultural 3 
Automobile and Accessories 2 
Banking 1 
Commercial and Services 6 
Construction and Allied 2 
Insurance 3 
Investment 1 
Manufacturing and Allied 3 
Total 21 




The breakdown of sample firms according to size is as follows (see appendix 4 for 
information on the classification): 
Small Cap Stocks 10 
Medium Cap Stocks 7 
Large Cap Stocks 4 
Total 21 
Table 2: Breakdown of sample by size 
3.4 Data Type 
The daily returns of 21 companies that have issued profit warnings in the NSE are used. 
The daily returns are used so as to come up with the cleanest evidence on market 
efficiency (Fama, 1970). 
3.5 Period of Study 
The study will cover a period of 14 years from 2002 to 2016.4 
3.6 Sources of Data 
The profit warning date will be the date of each company’s profit warning 
announcement to the regulator and its own shareholders (the notification to both the 
aforementioned parties is usually done simultaneously).  




                                                 
4
 Though the NSE has been in existence since 1953, the requirement for profit warnings came into effect in 2002 
through legal notice number 60.  
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3.7 Model Design 
 The single index model (market model) defines the expected returns as                               
𝑟𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑟𝑀𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 where:  
𝑟𝑡 is the expected return of a stock during period t.  
𝛼 is the rate of return that the stock would realize when the market return is 
equal to zero. 
𝛽 is the measure of sensitivity of the stock’s return to the market return. 
𝑟𝑀𝑡 is the market rate of return during the same period 
𝜀𝑡is the component of the stock's return resulting from firm specific events 
The firm specific return may be interpreted as the unexpected results from the event 
[(Bodie et al) (Trillas & Bel, 2005)]. These abnormal returns can be expressed as 𝜀𝑡 =
𝑟𝑡 − (𝛼 + 𝛽𝑟𝑀𝑡) that is the actual return less the expected return. 
3.8 Research Procedure 
The procedure for the methodology then proceeds as follows: 
1. Identify companies that have issued profit warnings in the past 14 years. 
2. Determine the exact date of announcement and designate it time t = 0. 
3. Identify the estimation, event and post event windows. The estimation period 
will be 100 days before the occurrence of the event, the event window 30 days 




Figure 2: The event study timeline. 
Figure 2: The event study timeline. 
4. Estimate parameters using the data estimation window. 
𝛼, 𝛽 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝜀𝑡  
5. Measure abnormal return for each day in the event window  
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑟𝑡 − (𝛼 + 𝛽𝑟𝑀𝑡) 
6. For each day in the event period, calculate the average abnormal return for all 
the firms in the sample. These minimizes the effects of other events occurring 
during the same period. 
7. Sum the daily abnormal returns to obtain a cumulative average abnormal return.  
8. Divide the cumulative average abnormal return of each firm by the firm’s error 






3.9 Interpretation of Results 
The results are interpreted as follows (Kodongo, 2012): 
1. If the abnormal returns take longer than one day to be reflected the market is 
weak form efficient. 
2. If the largest abnormal return occurs on the day of the announcement, then the 
market has a semi strong form efficiency. 
3. If the abnormal returns occur prior to the day of announcement, it can be because 
of market anticipation, a prior surprise announcement or insider trading. This 
test is the focus of the study.  
3.10 Critique of the model 
By using a simple OLS procedure, the parameter β will have a bias due to non-
synchronous trading (Brown & Warner, 1985).The bias, however, should offer no clear 
cut advantage over the simple OLS regression; which is preferred due to its parsimony. 
The level of significance of 10% of the cumulative abnormal return may be subjective 
depending on the investor. It is chosen arbitrarily to prove the concept of materiality of 
decline prior to the issuance of a profit warning. 
The model depends highly on the accuracy of the event date (Peterson, 1989). The date 
of issuance of the profit warning can differ from the date of publication or the date when 
the profit warning receives media attention. This can seriously affect the accuracy of the 




3.11 Chapter Summary 
The methodology used seeks to determine what the returns of the 21 firms in the sample 
should have been without occurrence of a profit warning; by use of the market model. 
Comparing these results to the actual returns will enable the determination of abnormal 
returns. This is the change in the returns as a result of the profit warning. The study will 
then go on to determine how these abnormal returns are distributed over the profit 
warning period to determine if adjustments to returns begins prior to the issuance of 
profit warnings and how large the initial adjustment is.  
27 
 
4. DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
Figure 3: Sample aggregate 30 day event window (Non-standardized). 
 
Figure 4: Sample aggregate 10 day event window (Non-standardized). 
28 
 
The data from the non-standardized average abnormal returns suggests that there is a 
slight reaction to profit warnings 2 days prior to the announcement. However, the bulk 
of the negative abnormal returns occur 2 days after the warning is issued. This is an 
illustration of a weak form efficient market with little market anticipation. The decline 
of the sample prior to the issuance of a profit warning is 2.976% of the total share price 
decline meaning that the disadvantage to the shareholders relying on profit warnings 
is quite insignificant.   
To take into account the effects of random fluctuations, the abnormal returns are 
standardized by dividing them by the error term from the linear regression of each 
company’s normal return at a given time period. This yields graphical results that are 
similar albeit with slight differences and different absolute values. The graphical results 














Figure 5: Sample aggregate 30 day event window (Standardized). 
 
Figure 6: Sample aggregate 10 day event window (Standardized). 
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Event Window Aggregate Abnormal Returns  
Event 
Window (-15,-6) (-5,-2) (-1,0] (0,0) [0,1) (2,5) (6,15) (-15,15) 
CAAR 0.225435 0.003257 -0.002796 -0.002425 -0.027617 -0.024819 0.143587 0.314623 
SCAAR 6.861762 0.044286 -0.133247 0.035141 -1.148019 -1.507168 0.545787 4.698541 
Table 3: Sample aggregate abnormal returns during event window. 
Event Window Daily Abnormal Returns  
Day -15 -14 -13 -12 -11 -10 -9 -8 -7 -6 
AAR 0.0052 0.0064 0.0026 0.0103 0.0012 0.2073 0.0020 -0.0108 0.0002 0.0010 
CAAR 0.0052 0.0116 0.0142 0.0245 0.0258 0.2331 0.2351 0.2243 0.2245 0.2254 
SAAR 0.1937 0.1312 0.0824 0.3442 -0.0569 6.1394 0.3462 -0.3381 -0.0598 0.0795 
SCAAR 0.1937 0.3248 0.4072 0.7515 0.6946 6.8340 7.1802 6.8421 6.7823 6.8618 
 
Day -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
AAR 0.0011 -0.0026 0.0060 -0.0012 -0.0028 -0.0024 -0.0276 -0.0331 -0.0033 0.0153 
-
0.0037 
CAAR 0.2266 0.2239 0.2299 0.2287 0.2259 0.2235 0.1959 0.1627 0.1595 0.1747 0.1710 
SAAR 0.0050 -0.0873 0.2155 -0.0888 -0.1332 0.0351 -1.1480 -1.6289 -0.3923 0.4704 0.0435 
SCAAR 6.8668 6.7794 6.9949 6.9060 6.7728 6.8079 5.6599 4.0310 3.6388 4.1092 4.1528 
 
Day 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
AAR 0.0042 0.0028 0.0112 0.0179 0.0044 -0.0002 0.0087 0.0013 0.0948 -0.0016 
CAAR 0.1752 0.1781 0.1893 0.2072 0.2116 0.2114 0.2202 0.2215 0.3162 0.3146 
SAAR -0.2195 0.0762 0.4394 0.7848 0.3344 -0.3121 0.3574 -0.0076 -0.8306 -0.0765 
SCAAR 3.9332 4.0094 4.4488 5.2336 5.5680 5.2559 5.6133 5.6057 4.7751 4.6985 





The large positive abnormal return on day 8 is unorthodox and necessitates focusing 
on a 10 day event window to have a clear picture of the negative abnormal returns 
around the profit warning date (day zero). It is caused by a large positive abnormal 
return in Sameer group. Even the use of a sample and averaging out of results is unable 
to fully remove the effect of that single fluctuation. This is illustrated below where the 
effect of averaging out in the sample reduces the abnormal return from 42 to 6. 
 




Uchumi is an interesting case in this study as no negative abnormal returns are recorded during 
the profit warning period. This can be largely attributed to the fact that Uchumi has been in 
distress for a long period such that investors had already factored this into the share price. 
 
Figure 8: Comparison of Uchumi and sample during event window. 
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EABL’s response is typical of a large well capitalized stock which is closely watched by 
shareholders and market analysts. Compared to the sample, anticipation begins about 6 days to 
the profit warning and the bulk of the adjustment occurs on the day of profit warning 
announcement. 
 




Kenya Airways has a typical response of a medium capitalized company. A lag of a day after 
announcement of profit warnings occurs before the bulk of the adjustment occurs on day1 and 2 
after the profit warning. 
 




5. DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter answers the research questions with regards to the analysis done in the 
previous chapter. It begins with a summary of the main issues the project sought to 
answer and the methodology used to achieve this. A discussion of the key findings from 
the data analysis and how these findings compare and contrast with previous studies 
then follows. Finally recommendations for further advancement of the topic are made. 
5.2 Summary 
The purpose of the study was to determine whether share prices begin declining prior 
to the issuance of a profit warning on the occurrence of an adverse effect.  Also if such 
a decline prior to the issuance of a profit warning is of material significance to 
disenfranchise investors who rely on profit warnings. The methodology used was a 
market model event study.  The finding from the analysis was that share prices for the 
sample begin declining two days prior to the issuance of profit warnings. These 
represents 2.976% of the total decline over the entire event window. 
5.3 Discussion 
The study finds that share prices begin to decline two days prior to the issuance of a 
profit warning as compared to five days prior according to Jackson and Madura (2003). 
Since their study is based in the NYSE which is a semi-efficient market, anticipation of 
share price decline is likely to be higher than in the NSE which is a weak form efficient 
market. 
The study also finds that the decline prior to the issuance of a profit warning in the 
sample is 2.976% of the total decline which pales in comparison to the 16.26% in Jackson 
and Madura (2003); which also had a statistical significance at the 0.1% level. NSE 
investors can therefore rely on profit warnings to a larger extent compared to NYSE 




Decline in share prices in the NSE as a result of issuance of profit warnings begins two 
days prior to the issuance of a profit warning. The decline that occurs in the pre-event 
window is however statistically insignificant at 2.976% of the total decline over the 
entire profit warning period.  
The bulk of the downward adjustment of share prices occurs during the day of profit 
warning up to two days after the issuance of the profit warning. Investors in the NSE 
can largely rely on the profit warnings issued by listed companies without significant 
loss in value. 
5.5 Recommendations 
Further research on the causes of adjustment of share prices prior to profit warnings 
should be carried out to determine whether this prior decline is as a result of general 
market anticipation or insider information. 
It would also be interesting to determine whether other market indicators can reliably 
be used by investors instead of relying on profit warnings. This is more important in 
cases such as Jackson and Madura (2003) where the adjustment prior to the warning is 





Anderson, W. W., & Chang, A. (2011). Are Profit Warnings and Suspension Notices 
Adequate Disclosures of distress? London: University of Canterbury. Department 
of Economics and Finance. 
Bernard, V., & Abarbanell, J. (1992). Tests of analysts' overreaction/under reaction to 
earnings information as an explanation for anomalous stock price behavior. The 
Journal of Finance, 26. 
Binder, J. (1998). The Event Study Methodology since 1969. Review of Quantitative 
Finance and Accounting, 27. 
Brown, S., & Warner, J. (1985). Using daily stock returns: The case of event studies. 
Journal of financial economics, 31. 
Bulkley, G., & Herrerias, R. (2003). Stock Returns Following Profit Warnings: Evidence 
for Behavioral Finance. 32. 
Bulkley, G., & Herrerias, R. (2005). Does the precision of news affect market under 
reaction? Evidence from returns following two classes of profit warnings. 
European Financial Management, 21. 
Cornell, B., & Roll, R. (1981). Strategies for pairwise competitions in markets and 
organizations. The Bell Journal of Economics, 12. 
Collins, D., & Dent, W. (1984). A Comparison of Alternative Testing Methodologies 
Used in Capital Market Research. Journal of Accounting Research, 36. 
Fama, E. F. (1965). The behavior of stock-market prices. The journal of Business, 71. 
Fama, E. (1970). Efficient capital markets: A review of theory and empirical work. The 
Journal of Finance. 
38 
 
Fama, E. F., & Malkiel, B. G. (1970). Efficient capital markets: A review of theory and 
empirical work. The journal of Finance, 34. 
Fama, E. (1976). Foundations of Finance. New York: Basic Books. 
Fama, E. F. (1976). Efficient capital markets: reply. The Journal of Finance, 2. 
Fama, E. F. (1991). Efficient capital markets: II. The journal of finance, 42. 
Fama, E. F. (1998). Market efficiency, long-term returns, and behavioral finance. Journal 
of financial economics, 23. 
Fama, E., Fisher, L., Jensen, M. C., & Roll, R. (1969). The adjustment of stock prices to 
new information. International economic review, 21. 
Firth, M. (1976). The impact of earnings announcements on the share price behaviour 
of similar type firms. The Economic Journal, 10. 
Francoeur, C., Labelle, R., & Martinez, I. (2008). Governance and the decision to issue a 
profit warning. Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences, 16. 
Grossman, S., & Stiglitz, J. (1980). On the impossibility of informationally efficient 
markets. The American economic review, 15. 
Jensen, M. C. (2005). Agency costs of overvalued equity. Financial management, 14. 
Jaffe, J. (1974). Special Information and Insider Trading. The Journal of Business, 18. 
Kodongo, O. (2012). Market Efficiency. 19. 
LeRoy, S. F. (1989). Efficient capital markets and martingales. Journal of Economic 
literature, 38. 




Madura, J., & Jackson, D. (2003). Profit warnings and timing. Financial Review, 16. 
Malkiel, B. G. (1991). Efficient market hypothesis. In The World of Economics (pp. 211-
218). London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. 
Netter, J. M., & Jones, S. L. (2008). Efficient capital markets. The Concise Encyclopedia of 
Economic, 15. 
Oakley, P. (2016). Restaurant Group - A case study in profit warnings. London: sharescope. 
Peterson, P. P. (1989). Event Studies: A Review of Issues and Methodology. Quarterly 
Journal of Business and Economics, 31. 
Sletnes, K., & Dons, E. (2013). The Information Content in Profit Warnings and the 
Implications for Market Rationality. 99. 
Sphor, J. (2014). The share is down 8% after the profit warning, is it time to buy? Applied 
Economics letters. 
Trillas, F., & Bel, G. (2005). Privatization, corporate control and regulatory reform: the 
case of Telefonica. Telecommunications Policy, 26. 
Walker, M., & Helbok, G. (2003). On the willingness of UK companies to issue profit 
warnings: Regulatory, earnings surprise permanence, and agency cost effects. 




Appendix 1: List of Companies that have issued profit warnings in the NSE 
included in the study 
1. BOC 
2. Britam 
3. Cars and General 
4. Centum 
5. Crown Paints 
6. East African Breweries Limited (EABL) 
7. East African Cables 
8. Express Kenya 
9. Kakuzi 
10. Kapchorua Tea 
11. Kenya Airways 
12. Liberty Kenya Holdings 
13. Longhorn 
14. Mumias Sugar (2014) 
      Mumias Sugar (2015) 
15. Pan Africa Insurance 
16. Sameer Africa (2008) 
      Sameer Africa (2014) 
17. Sasini Limited 
18. Standard Chartered 
19. Standard Group 






Appendix 2: Table of Companies that have issued profit warnings in the NSE 
 
Company Date of Warning Reason for Warning Period of Study 
BOC 9/12/2015 
Lower sales, Currency 
exchange losses and a large 
non-operating profit in the 
previous year. 16/08/2015-22/04/2016 
Britam 23/12/2015 
Decline in fair value gains on 
financial assets. 30/08/2015-6/05/2016 
Cars and 
general 06/08/2015 
Devaluation of regional 
currencies. 13/04/2015-19/12/2015 
Centum 01/04/2009 
Impairment of holding in Rift 
Valley Railways. 7/12/2008-14/08/2009 
Crown paints 19/02/2015 
Challenging market 
dynamics for subsidiaries in 
expansion program. 27/10/2014-4/07/2015 
EABL 31/07/2013 Rise in financing cost. 18/03/2013-23/11/2013 
East African 
Cables 25/08/2015 
Refurbishment in production 
facility. 2/05/2015-7/01/2016 
Express Kenya 26/08/2015 
Economic downturn affecting 




Downward pricing pressure 
from exports due to 
recessionary trends in Europe 








Security concerns in the 
country. Prolonged Ebola 
crisis in West Africa. Write 
down of aircraft approved 
from sale. 20/07/2014-27/03/2015 
Liberty Kenya 
Holdings 29/01/2016 
Decline in value of 
investments. 6/10/2015-12/06/2016 
Longhorn 12/09/2012 
Reduced funding for primary 




arising from a significant 
drop in sugar prices due to an 






Challenges facing the sugar 
market, sugar cane shortage 
and closure of the factory. 21/04/2015-27/12/2015 
Pan Africa 
Insurance 29/12/2015 
Adverse equity market 
conditions leading to decline 
in investments. 5/09/2015-12/05/2016 
Sameer Africa 
(2008) 26/05/2008 
Post-election crisis. Rising 
cost of tyre and fuel inputs. 1/02/2008-8/10/2008 
Sameer Africa 
(2014) 30/06/2014 
Sale of leasehold land booked 
as revenue in the previous 
year. 7/03/2014-12/11/2014 
Sasini Limited 28/05/2014 
Lower prices of tea and lower 
production volumes of coffee. 2/02/2014-10/10/2014 
Standard 
chartered 25/11/2015 
Increase in non-performing 
loan portfolio. One off 
disposal of property in the 
previous year. 2/08/2015-8/04/2016 
Standard 
group 27/08/2015 
Disruption of broadcasting 




environment affected by 

























Appendix 3: Ranking of Companies in the NSE based on Market Capitalization 
 
Company Market Cap as at 01 Dec 2014 Rank SUM 
Small Cap Counters 





 A.Baumann                                 
42,624,732.60  
2 
 Marshalls                                
143,931,060.00  
3 
 Express                               
212,422,740.00  
4 
 Olympia                                
248,000,000.00  
5 
 Kapchorua                               
606,360,000.00  
6 
 Eveready                                
766,500,000.00  
7 
 Eaagads                           
1,414,908,000.00  
8 
 Limuru Tea                            
1,422,000,000.00  
9 
Longhorn                           
1,521,000,000.00  
10 
Orchards                            
1,608,515,500.00  
11 
 Rea Vipingo                            
1,650,000,000.00  
12 
 Sameer                            
1,739,639,956.25  
13 
Home Africa                           
1,742,597,876.00  
14 
 C & G                           
1,965,062,092.00  
15 
 Uchumi                            
2,415,364,187.60  
16 
 WTK                           
2,434,256,960.00  
17 
 B.O.C                            
2,655,460,656.00  
18 
 Crown                            
2,942,148,000.00  
19 
 Mumias                           
3,060,000,000.00  
20 





Medium Cap Counters 
 Standard                            
3,126,241,656.00  
22 7 
 Unga                            
3,179,772,666.00  
23 
 E.A.Cables                            
4,024,687,500.00  
24 
NSE                           
4,135,781,250.00  
25 
 Total                            
4,244,446,120.50  
26 
 Kakuzi                            
4,311,999,780.00  
27 
TCL                           
5,605,689,520.00  
28 
 Carbacid                           
5,670,456,733.00  
29 
 EAPCC                           
5,850,000,000.00  
30 
 TPS EA                           
6,649,354,942.00  
31 
 NBK                           
7,070,000,000.00  
32 
 CMC                            
7,866,577,440.00  
33 
 HFCK                         
11,080,250,000.00  
34 
 Pan Africa                         
11,232,000,000.00  
35 
 Kenya Re                          
11,759,144,342.40  
36 
 KQ                        
12,345,869,538.75  
37 
 Kenol                         
13,760,967,220.00  
38 
 Scan                         
16,670,064,488.00  
39 





 KenGen                         
23,632,385,652.00  
41 
CIC                         
25,370,723,721.60  
42 
Large Cap Counters 
 Jubilee                          
26,473,590,000.00  
43 4 
 KPLC                         
30,150,165,845.25  
44 
Umeme                         
35,725,316,110.00  
45 
 NIC                          
38,226,084,032.00  
46 
 Centum                        
40,591,948,275.00  
47 
 ARM                         
42,593,650,000.00  
48 
 CFC                          
48,624,561,474.00  
49 
I&M                         
49,829,978,953.00  
50 
 BAICL                        
50,398,811,788.00  
51 
 NMG                         
55,619,974,370.00  
52 
 Bamburi                          
56,258,687,625.00  
53 
 DTK                         
61,011,746,460.00  
54 
 BAT                         
90,100,000,000.00  
55 
 Barclays                          
92,336,112,000.00  
56 
Co-op                         
92,652,543,790.25  
57 
 Stan Chart                      
102,950,118,162.00  
58 





 Equity                        
184,213,156,745.00  
60 
 EABL                      
239,604,629,868.00  
61 
 Safaricom                        
552,902,906,400.00  
62 
 
